By making use of a geometry of preferences, Abe (2012) proves the Gul and Pesendorfer's utility representation theorem about temptation without self-control. This companion paper provides a similar proof for the Gul and Pesendorfer's utility representation theorem about temptation and costly self-control. As a result, the both theorems are proved in the unified way.
Introduction
There is a large and growing literature on temptation and self-control in economics [1] [2] . Gul and Pesendorfer [3] propose basic models of choice under temptation and provide preference foundations for the models. We provide an alternative proof of the main theorem in [3] , that is, the Gul and Pesendorfer's utility representation theorem about temptation and costly self-control. The proof makes use of a geometry of preferences and goes as follows. We first extract behaviors that display temptation and self-control. We then characterize the intuitive notions of temptation and self-control geometrically. Finally, we prove the utility representation theorem using the characterization. The proof highlights the reason why the self-control part can be written by sum of commitment utility and temptation utility. The proof also provides the refined testable implications of the Gul and Pesendorfer model. This geometric approach is taken by the companion paper, [4] , to prove the Gul and Pesendorfer's utility representation theorem about temptation without self-control. As a result, we prove the two representation theorems by an intuitive and unified approach. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the Gul and Pesendorfer's utility representation theorem. In Section 3, we explore our notions of temptation and self-control and derive those cone representa-tions. Section 4 proves the Gul and Pesendorfer's representation theorem using the result of Section 3. In Section 5, we discuss relation between our approach and the Gul and Pesendorfer's approach.
The Gul and Pesendorfer Theorem
Let Z be a compact metric space of prizes. Let ∆ be the set of all Borel probability measures over Z and be endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Let  be the set of all compact (with respect to the topology of weak convergence) subsets of ∆ and be endowed with the topology induced by the Hausdorff metric. α ∈ . Throughout this paper, we say that f is cardinally equivalent to a function g when f g α β = + for some positive α and real β .
We call the following model of utility function the Gul and Pesendorfer model. 
for some , u v ∈  . Gul and Pesendorfer [3] provided preference foundations for this model. Let  be a binary relation over  . We say that  is  upper semi-continuous if the sets { }
are closed,  continuous if it is upper and lower semi-continuous.
We consider the following axioms. Axiom 1 (Preference).  is a complete and transitive binary relation. Axiom 2 (Continuity).  is continuous.
Axiom 3 (Independence).
A B  and
Axiom 4 (Set Betweenness). A B
 implies A A B B    . Axiom 1 is a standard revealed preference axiom. Axioms 2 and 3 are variants of the von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms adapted to the preferences-over-menus setting. Axioms 4 is viewed as intuitive notion of costly self-control behaviors under temptation as we explain below.
Imagine a situation in which an individual first chooses a menu and then selects an alternative from that menu. Suppose that the individual evaluates a menu by its best element. Such an individual's behavior is represented by a utility function U of the form ( ) ( )
Observe that an individual with this type of utility function follows a regularity called Strategic Rationality: A B  implies Ã A B  . 1 Clearly, any strategically rational decision maker does not exhibit a desire for commitment, where by `desire for commitment' we mean that an individual strictly prefers a subset of a menu to the menu itself.
Desire for commitment is an implication of temptation. An individual may strictly prefer menu A to menu A B  to avoid succumbing to temptation that is anticipated as follows: The individual anticipates that he/she will be tempted to select an alternative when facing menu A B  , and this alternative is undesired for him/her. Axiom 4 relaxes Strategic Rationality and allows a possibility that A A B B    . Suppose that B contains a tempting alternative. We can view A B B   as meaning that when facing menu A B  , the individual uses self-control and can resist the temptation. We then interpret A A B   as meaning that exercising self-control is costly.
Gul and Pesendorfer [3] showed the following representation theorem. 
Geometry of Temptation and Self-Control
This section explores some geometric properties of  that satisfies Set Betweenness (and von Neumann and Morgenstern type axioms). Specifically, as in [4] , we extract behaviors that display temptation and self-control and geometrically characterize the behaviors. All lemmas in this section are proved almost in the same way as Abe [4] and hence omitted. Lemma 0. (Gul and Pesendorfer ([4] , Lemma 1)).  satisfies Preference, Continuity, and Independence if and only if there exists a continuous affine function :
We define u by ( ) { } ( )
as in [3] . Since u represents preferences that the individual would like to commit to, it is called a commitment utility. Any commitment utility defined in this manner is continuous and affine from Lemma 0.
Consider a nontrivial preference relation  , that is, there are ,
. Set Betweenness induces the following four strict partial orders.
Two temptation relations display a desire for commitment in a binary menu. Suppose { } { } 
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 The weak temptation relation T and the weak resistance relation R are Strong Archimedean. 6 We now consider geometric representations of the four strict partial orders. Define four cones corresponding to the four relations as follows. . Temptation cones are defined as the set of "tempting directions", and resistance cones are defined as the set of "resisting directions". Corresponding to Lemma 1, those cones possess the following properties. 2 Gul and Pesendorfer [3] consider an extended preference relation over lotteries of menus that is defined in an obvious way and show that Axioms 1 to 3 naturally induce the same properties to the extended relation. They then obtain a function U as a von Neumann and Morgenstern preference-scaling function for expected utility representation of that relation and show by construction that U is indeed a continuous affine function. 3 Alternatively, we can rely on [6] to prove Lemma 0. Kopylov [6] applies the mixture space theorem to  that is restricted on the set of all convex menus and directly obtains U as a von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility of the restricted  . He then uses the property that every menu is indifferent to its convex hull, which is indeed implied from Axioms 1 to 3, and extends U naturally over  . 4 The fact that these orders are strict partial orders is proved in Lemma 1 below. 5 A binary relation R is said to be Asymmetric when xRy implies ( ) yRx ¬ , Transitive when xRy and yRz imply xRz , and satisfies Strong Independence when xRy if and only if ( ) ( ) 6 A binary relation R is Strong Archimedean if xRy and x Ry ′ ′ imply that there is an 7 We need a linear space for defining those cones. Here, we take the linear space (over  ) as the set of all finite Borel signed measures over Z. 
A Geometric Proof for the Gul and Pesendorfer Theorem
In this section, we prove that any regular self-control preference relation admits a Gul and Pesendorfer representation.
If  satisfies Axioms 1, 2, 3, and 4 and there are ,
x y y   , we say that  is a self-control preference relation. A self-control preference relation  is regular if both *  and *  are nonempty. 10 We first obtain two functions that represent temptation and self-control. Lemma 3. There exist , v w∈  such that for any , Then, we can apply Harsanyi's [7] aggregation theorem and obtain some constant ˆ, , a b c ∈  such that ˆû aw bv c = + + . Furthermore, we show below that ˆ0 a > and ˆ0 b < . Because  is a regular self-control preference relation, we can take , , ,
, and , we obtain the desired result. ∎ Lemma 4 means that the indifference curve of w lies between those of u and v when they pass a common point. From Lemma 4 together with Lemma 3, we further find the following fact that the self-control utility and the temptation utility exactly characterize temptation and costly self-control. The proof is immediate and thus omitted. 8 Consider a binary relation R on a domain. Let ′ ′ in the domain of R imply x Ry ′ ′ . 9 A face of a convex cone C is a nonempty convex subset F of C such that ,
A convex cone C is said to be faceless if C is the only face of C. 10 From Lemma 2, this is equivalent to the fact that there are , , ,
This is consistent with the concept of regularity proposed in Gul and Pesendorfer [3] . 11 This commitment utility u is defined in Section 3. 
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Let us now show that, for any
14 Consider translations ( ) ( ) ( )
15 Note then, under our supposition ( ) ( ) 
However then, since Recall from Lemma 4 that an appropriate scale-normalized commitment utility is the difference between the self-control utility and a scale-normalized temptation utility: au c w bv + = − . Therefore, we can calibrate utility value of { } , x y by the difference between the self-control utility of z and the normalized temptation utility of z. By the way of choosing z, we can hence calibrate utility 12 We can similarly show that
is cardinally equivalent to w over 14 Assuming the existence of such x′ is without loss of generality. See Appendix for the detail. 15 There is no loss of generality as for the footnote above. See Appendix for the detail. 16 Function f on Δ satisfies Translation Invariance if Proof. Since Û is cardinally equivalent to U, it is clearly a representation of  . We now show that Û is a Gul and Pesendorfer model restricted on binary menus. Then, this lemma immediately follows from the extension result of Gul and Pesendorfer [3] . 18 Assume that { } { } { } where the first equality follows from Lemma 6, the second from Lemma 3, and the third and the last from Lemma 4. This completes the proof.∎ Remark. Until now, we have focused on regular self-control preferences. Let us comment about the other cases. As heretofore, suppose that  satisfies Axiom 1, 2, 3, and 4.
We first consider the case that { } { }
.This case is the degenerate case of no self-control preferences. Suppose that there exist , , ,
We can observe such a situation in Figure 1 by rotating the indifference curve of around x in anticlockwise direction and placing it over the indifference curve of v. But, Figure 1 indicates that it is incompatible with Continuity. Hence, in this case, there is no case other than the two extreme cases: dinally equivalent to u. We can observe such a situation in Figure 1 by rotating the indifference curve of w around x in clockwise direction and placing it over the indifference curve of u. But, Figure 1 indicates that it is incompatible with Continuity.
Consider finally case (iii). In this case, { } { }
x y y   . Hence,  restricted on singletons is equal to R and the inverse of T. Therefore, commitment utility, self-control utility, and (−1) × temptation utility are cardinally equivalent. In this degenerate case, we can easily prove Theorem 1 by constructing v directly.
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Discussion
We provided an alternative proof of the Gul and Pesendorfer's utility representation theorem about temptation and self-control. In what follows, we clarify relations between our geometric approach and the Gul and Pesendorfer's original approach.
Gul and Pesendorfer [3] proved the theorem in a way different from ours. Their approach is constructive. 
tion utility v is viewed as measuring marginal utility for commitment. They showed under the conditions of Theorem 1 that v is indeed well-defined, continuous, and affine. This part serves as a building block to establish the desired representation.
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The constructive approach and the geometric approach taken here bring us additional but different benefits beyond just establishing the representation theorem. 24 The former directly tells us how to calibrate temptation. On the other hand, the latter directly defines temptation and self-control in terms of preferences, so that it directly relates temptation and self-control utilities to particular intuitive properties of the underlying preferences.
The direct link between the two utilities and preferences promotes a better understanding of the Gul and Pesendorfer model. It highlights the reason why the self-control part can be written by sum of commitment utility and temptation utility. It is because we directly proved that all three dynamic considerations have linear structure and self-control considerations lie between commitment and temptation.
Moreover, the link provides the refined testable implications of the model. Our characterization of T, * T , R, and * R will be used to test the Gul and Pesendorfer model. First, it is helpful to design an experiment or a questionnaire. Since Independence and/or Set Betweenness are written in terms of choices over all menus, testing literally them entails a comprehensive examination of choices that uses not only small menus but large menus. The properties of T, * T , R, and * R provide simple testable implications of the model that are written by menus that include at most two elements.
Second, more importantly, because temptation utility v and self-control utility w are characterized by T, − for all Δ y ∈ . 22 We note that our geometric approach does not work well in this degenerate case. Specifically, in the proof of Lemma 7, we cannot take a z by which we calibrate utility value of { } , x y . 23 Kopylov [6] proved Theorem 1 for a more general choice object than the one considered here and applied it to characterize various models associated with temptation. In his proof, he also constructs the temptation utility directly in the same spirit with Gul and Pesendorfer [3] by
, where * C and * C are some convex menus such that * * * * C C C C    . As Gul and Pesendorfer [3] did, he directly proved that ( ) U A can be written by the defined in the form of Theorem 1. 24 As Gul and Pesendorfer ( [3] , footnote 6) conjecture, there is another approach to prove Theorem 1 which is based on a representation theorem characterizing a general model called a finite additive expected utility representation. See Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [10] for the case of finite Z and Kopylov [11] for a more general choice object. 
for all r ∈  and all * t ∈  . Note from Lemma 2 that  (resp.,  ) is a faceless convex cone and misses convex set *  (resp., 
The latter property is guaranteed by the above fact that
Similarly, using lower semi-continuity of U and the fact that 
This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2. Take , Δ x x′ ∈ with { } { } Since ( ) ( ) ( where the last equality follows from Lemma 3. This is a contradiction.
Step 3. 
